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1. Introduction 
On 4
th
 August 2016 the Ghanaian parliament marked the advent of a new era for the 
country‟s nascent petroleum industry with the enactment into law of the Petroleum 
(Exploration and Production) Act, 2016 [Act 919]. Act 919 is considered to represent a major 
milestone in the legislative history of the upstream oil and gas industry in Ghana. The 
defining ethos of the new petroleum law is a strategic positioning of the oil and gas sector as 
the hub of the Ghanaian economy. This is with a view to ensuring for the sector the status of 
an engine or catalyst for economic growth. The main objective of this article is analyse the 
key provisions of the new law, and to reflect on the legislative background to the upstream 
petroleum industry in Ghana. The paper appraises the new statute‟s fitness for purpose 
through a critical examination of its regulatory aspirations together with its legislative 
ambitions. The discussion is set against the historical background of petroleum exploration 
and production in Ghana. 
Act 919 overlays a substantial corpus juris of legislative enactments which together 
make up the legal framework governing the upstream petroleum industry in Ghana. As such, 
it could be argued to be in effect a consolidating statute. Evidence of this can be found in its 
many overlapping provisions, replicating as it does some aspects of the Ghana Model 
Petroleum Agreement (MPA) of 2000, together with aspects of the fiscal regime contained in 
previous legislation and fiscal instruments. Overlapping provisions in the overall legal 
framework have, inevitably, led to some inconsistencies. Also identified in the concluding 
sections of this paper are a number of obsolete provisions from previous legislation and 
instruments. The final part of the article outlines a number of recommendations, including the 
need to streamline the legislative framework as a whole with a view to reconciling 
inconsistent provisions and excising redundant references from current texts.  
2. Historical Overview of the Petroleum Industry in Ghana 
Better known for its gold mining and cocoa industries, Ghana is a relatively newcomer to 
the international petroleum scene. However, the history of oil exploration and prospecting in 
Ghana stretches back to 1896. A review of the petroleum industry in Ghana reveals four main 
historical phases as follows: 
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2.1. Phase 1 - Origins of petroleum in Ghana 
This period covers of the early colonial era right up to 1957. Oil exploration activity 
in Ghana dates back to 1896 in what was then the Gold Coast under British colonial 
administration. The first shallow onshore wells drilled in Tano Basin, now in the Western 
Region of Ghana. Exploration took the form of wildcat drilling with no systematic pattern. 
Prospecting activities focused on areas with the presence of oil and gas seepages which were 
known to the early explorers.  
Despite what appeared to be a favourable geological environment together with the 
early promising signs and the fact that most of the shallow wells encountered hydrocarbons in 
shallow horizons, such unsystematic and opportunistic wildcatting activities did not lead to 
any significant discoveries. Estimates of the number of onshore exploratory wells drilled in 
the Tano Basin during this initial phase from 1896 to 1957 range from 17 to 21 onshore 
wells.
1
 The Gulf Oil Company, through its acquisition of four onshore exploration licenses 
and the drilling of four wells, marked the end of this initial 61 year phase in the petroleum 
exploration history of Ghana. From a legal perspective, the most notable feature of this phase 
is the absence of a specific legal framework dedicated to the petroleum industry. From 1962 
to 1984, petroleum exploration and development licences were issued under the Minerals Act 
1962 (Act 126).  
 
2.2. Phase 2 - Offshore exploration 
The second period of oil exploration in Ghana coincides with the post-independence 
era from 1957 to 1979. This phase ushered in the onset of offshore exploration with a 
concentration of interest in the continental shelf. With all of the 22 continental shelf 
exploration blocks fully licensed by 1968,
2
 this period represents the offshore phase of the 
petroleum industry in Ghana. The early exploration was conducted mainly by Soviet and 
Romanian teams, with the Industrial Export Company of Romania at the forefront of 
exploration efforts both onshore in the Kata Basin and also offshore.
3
 This phase also marked 
the introduction of a minimum work obligation for exploration licence holders, with a 
requirement to drill at least one well to a total depth of 12,000 ft within 18 months of signing 
the exploration agreement.
4
 
                                                          
1
 http://www.petrocom.gov.gh/exploration-history.html: accessed on 12 November 2016.  
2
 Ibid, p.2. 
3
 Ibid. 
4
 Ibid. 
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The period from 1972-1979 witnessed the intensification of exploration efforts with 
the drilling 17 wells, 15 of which were offshore. However, the only significant discovery was 
the Saltpond Oil Field which came on-stream in 1978 following the initial discovery by 
Signal/Amoco Group in 1970. On the whole, the exploration effort during this phase 
remained rudimentary. The datasets were poor and it is likely that some onshore wells such as 
Takoradi 11-1 were possibly drilled off-structure.
5
 
 
2.3. Phase 3 - Sector-specific legislative and institutional developments 
From a legal perspective, the period from 1979-2001 marks the most important phase 
in the petroleum industry in Ghana, ushering in a raft of petroleum industry statutory 
instruments aimed at instituting a robust regulatory framework for governance of the sector. 
The forerunner of these legislative instruments was the Ghana National Petroleum 
Corporation Law [PNDC 64] of 16 June 1983, which established the institutional framework 
for upstream petroleum activities. This law can truly be considered as constituting the 
bedrock of petroleum legislation in Ghana. With exploration efforts continuing to yield 
promising results, there has been a corresponding increase in sector-specific legislative and 
statutory instruments. Key amongst these are the Petroleum Exploration and Production Law 
[PNDC 84] of 1984; the Petroleum Revenue Management Act of 2011 [Act 815]; and the 
Petroleum Commission Act of 2011 [Act 821],
6
 the Petroleum Income Tax Law [PNDC 188] 
of 1987, and the Petroleum Commission Fees and Charges Regulations.  
The Ghana National Petroleum Corporation (GNPC) was established in 1983 to 
provide the institutional framework for upstream petroleum operations in Ghana. It was the 
statutory product of PNDC 64. Section 2 outlines the “Objects” of the GNPC. These include 
undertaking petroleum exploration, development, production and the disposal of petroleum 
products. The corporation is also tasked with ensuring the maximisation of benefits to the 
nation from petroleum resources,
7
 including technology transfer, capacity building, the 
training of nationals in the acquisition of petroleum industry skills and technical expertise,
8
 
and sound environmental practices in petroleum development.
9
 As part of its mandate, the 
GNPC is to engage in petroleum operations and enter into association agreements for 
                                                          
5
 Ibid, p.3. 
6
 See further A.J. Banful, “Ghana‟s Present Legal Framework for Upstream Petroleum Production”, in K. 
Appiah-Adu (Ed.), Governance of the Petroleum Sector in an Emerging Developing Economy (2013); pp.145-
162; Gower Publishing. ISBN 798-1-3155-8550-5. 
7
 Section 2(2)(b) of PNDC 64. 
8
 Section 2(2)(c) and (d). 
9
 Section 2(2)(e). 
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petroleum development including exploration, production, storage and transportation of 
petroleum products.
10
 Article 2.4 of the Ghana Model Petroleum Agreement (MPA) provides 
for a minimum of 10% initial carried interest in all petroleum agreements (GNPC‟s 
participating interest in fields currently under production such as the TEN oilfield is 15%).
11
  
PNDC 64 was closely followed by the Petroleum Exploration and Production Act 
[PNDC 84] of 1984. It was the first piece of legislation to contain substantive provisions 
regulating petroleum exploration and production. The piece of legislation has now been 
repealed and superseded by the new Petroleum (Exploration and Production) Act of 2016. 
The Jubilee Oilfield discovery of 2007 was followed a few years later by a number of 
legislative and institutional initiatives, prominent amongst which were the enactment of the 
Petroleum Revenue Management Act of 2011 and the establishment of the Petroleum 
Commission of Ghana as the country sought to capitalise on the gains from the new 
discoveries. The main objective of the Petroleum Revenue Management Act [Act 815] is to 
provide a legal framework to govern the collection, allocation and management of revenues 
accruing from upstream and midstream petroleum operations.
12
 To this effect Act 815 confers 
on the Minister of Finance and the Bank of Ghana the role of „custodians‟ of the Petroleum 
Holding Fund (PHF).
13
 They are assisted in this function by the Investment Advisory 
Committee.
14
  
One of the main features of Act 815 is the establishment of the Ghana Stabilisation 
Fund (GSF) which functions as a holding account for excess revenue in periods of high oil 
prices.  The objective of the fund is to utilise the excess revenue to stabilise public 
expenditure in a low oil price market.
15
 The other major contribution of the Act is the 
establishment of the Ghana Heritage Fund (GHF)
16
 whose objective is to provide an 
endowment, through savings and investments, aimed at promoting long term development 
goals for future generations. Both the GSF and the GHF are funded through allocations from 
the PHF.
17
  Act 815 aspires to ensure the efficient, diligent and judicious utilisation of 
                                                          
10
 Section 2(3)(a-f). 
11
 http://www.tullowoil.com/operations/west-africa/ghana/ten-field; accessed on 13 November 2016.   
12
 See generally, Republic of Ghana: 2015 Annual Report on the Petroleum Funds; 
http://www.mofep.gov.gh/sites/default/files/reports/petroleum/2015%20Annual%20Report%20on%20the%20P
etroleum%20Funds.pdf accessed on 17 November 2016. 
13
 Act 815, Sections 25-26. 
14
 Sections 29-40. 
15
 Section 9. 
16
 Section 10; see further F.K. Otto, “A Review of Ghana‟s Heritage Fund under the Ghana Petroleum Revenue 
Management Act 2011 (Act 815), 39 Journal of Law, Policy and Globalisation (2015), 1-15.  
17
 See further F. Ayensu, “Managing Ghana‟s Oil Revenue: Ghana Petroleum Funds (Gpfs)”, 1(2) Asian Journal 
of Humanities & Social Sciences (2013), 148-161. 
6 
 
petroleum revenues for the benefit of all Ghanaian citizens. The guiding principles of Act 815 
can thus be said to include government responsibility and accountability for revenues 
generated from petroleum development, transparency, sustainability, and inter-generational 
equity as evidenced by the establishment of the GHF.   
On 31 July 2015, the Ghanaian Parliament passed into law the Petroleum Revenue 
Management (Amendment) Act [Act 893] with a view to addressing the acknowledged 
shortcomings of Act 815 and the poor financial performance of the heritage fund. Evidence of 
poor performance can be seen in the fact that the cap or minimum amount to be held in the 
stabilisation fund has been progressively reduced over the years, with the “excess” amount 
transferred into the annual budget or used to service the national debt. Section 4 of the new 
Act 893 (which amends Section 11 of Act 815) stipulates that not more that 70% of 
benchmark petroleum revenue shall be allocated to the Annual Budget Funding Amount 
(ABFA). This, in effect, guarantees to the Ghana Petroleum Funds (GSF and GHF) receipts 
of not less than 30% of benchmark petroleum revenue from the PHF. Under Section 5 of Act 
893 (amending Section 12 of Act 815), withdrawals or transfers from the stabilisation fund 
into the annual budget is restricted to three purposes: (a) alleviating shortfalls in petroleum 
revenue; (b) transfers into the Contingency Fund; and (c) debt repayment. The amendment 
further provides that transfers for the purpose of alleviating revenue shortfalls shall not 
exceed 75% of the outstanding balance in the stabilisation fund. Furthermore, Section 13 of 
Act 893 (amending Section 57 of Act 815), now provides funding for the thirteen-member 
Public Interest Accountability Committee (PIAC) from the annual budget fund in a measure 
aimed at promoting greater oversight, accountability and transparency in the management of 
oil revenues.    
It is hoped that these remedial measures should in the long term address the 
acknowledged deficiencies which in the past have stalled the growth of the Ghanaian 
petroleum funds. Initially set at US$ 250 million at its inception, the threshold minimum 
amount for the stabilisation fund was reduced to US$ 150 million in 2015 and currently 
stands at US$ 100 million.
18
 It may well take another period of sustained growth in oil prices 
for the funds to be replenished.  
As the government embarked on these legislative and regulatory initiatives, 
developments were also taking place further afield with the modernisation of exploration 
                                                          
18
 See further “Stabilisation Fund reaches all-time low, faces collapse”, Business and Financial Times of Ghana, 
November 16, 2016: https://asokoinsight.com/news/stabilisation-fund-reaches-all-time-low-faces-collapse-
ghana; accessed on 18 November 2016. 
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methods and the increasing use of seismic surveys, first 2D (from 1983-1989) and then 3D 
(from 1989 onwards) – thus leading to the acquisition of better-quality data sets and much 
improved prospecting results.
19
  
 
2.4. Phase 4 - Modern era (2001 to present)  
Phase 4 marks the modern era of the upstream petroleum industry in Ghana with the 
onset of commercial oil production, and the acquisition of the status of a net petroleum 
exporter. This phase was heralded by the coming on-stream of the offshore Jubilee Oilfield, 
which comprises of the Mahogany 1 (M-1) and Hyedua (H-1) exploration wells drilled into 
what has been described as “… high quality stacked reservoir sands with large continuous 
accumulations of light sweet crude oil”.20 Approximately 5 miles apart, the two wells provide 
the hub for the Jubilee Oilfield which straddles the West Cape Three Points and Deepwater 
Tano licence blocks. The field was discovered by Kosmos Energy in 2007 and developed by 
Tallow Oil Plc in the role of operator, with commercial production commencing in 2010. 
Participating interests in the field are as follows: Tallow (35.48%), Kosmos (24.08%), 
Anadarko (24.08%), GNPC (13.64%) and Petro SA (2.72%).
21
 Daily production from the 
field in 2015 was 102,600 bpd.
22
 It is expected that this production figure will be boosted 
following approval of Tullow‟s Greater Jubilee Full Field Development Plan.  
 The Jubilee Oilfield currently occupies the prime position as the jewel in crown of 
Ghana‟s nascent petroleum industry. In second place is the TEN (Tweneboa, Enyenra and 
Ntomme) Oilfield discovery which is located offshore, and west of Jubilee. With Tallow Oil 
as the operator, when fully developed TEN is expected to yield 76,000 bpd. The field forms 
part of Ghana‟s strategy to double its current oil production by the year 2021.23 It is worth 
noting that in 2012 petroleum displaced cocoa as the second export income earner for Ghana 
after gold.
24
 With increasing production, there is a good prospect that oil could one day 
become the primary export earner, furnishing the income generation and thus the catalyst for 
economic growth.  
There have not been any significant onshore discoveries to date. However, following 
a 40-year hiatus, a major onshore exploration programme (the Voltaian Basin Project (VBP)), 
                                                          
19
 Supra, note 1. 
20
 http://www.tullowoil.com/operations/west-africa/ghana/jubilee-field; accessed on 17 November 2016. 
21
 Ibid. 
22
 Ibid. 
23
 http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-04-24/ghana-oil-output-to-more-than-double-by-2021-with-
new-fields  
24
 Ibid. 
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has been launched by the GNPC. Covering the period 2015-2019, VBP is described by the 
GNPC as a 5-year initial project aimed at 2D seismic data acquisition and processing, 
establishing prospectivity, enhancing knowledge base of the Voltaian Basin, and increasing 
the petroleum reserve base of the country.
25
   
Legislative initiatives during this phase include the enactment of the Petroleum 
Commission Act in 2011 [Act 821]. Act 821 established the Petroleum Commission of Ghana 
and conferred on it the regulatory role for the upstream petroleum industry. Section 2 of the 
Act outlines the mission or objects of the Commission, its main function being “… to 
regulate and manage the utilisation of petroleum resources and to co-ordinate the policies in 
relation to them.” Other tasks of the Commission include, inter alia: to monitor petroleum 
activities through inspections; to enforce compliance by upstream petroleum operators with 
relevant regulations (including compliance with fiscal metering requirements); to promote 
local content and local participation as prescribed by PNDC 84; to ensure optimal utilisation 
of petroleum infrastructure; and to receive and store petroleum data and manage the national 
petroleum repository.
26
 
Listed amongst the Commission‟s most important functions are to receive 
applications and issue permits for specific petroleum activities (i.e. role of licensor),
27
 and to 
assess and approve appraisal programmes.
28
 Section 3(a-c) of Act 821 re-assigns to the 
Commission the fledgling regulatory role conferred on the GNPC under Section 24(2) of the 
Ghana National Petroleum Corporation Law of 1983 [PNDC 64] by requiring the 
Commission to “… promote planned, well executed, sustainable and cost efficient petroleum 
activities … for the overall benefit and welfare of [Ghanaian] citizens,”29 and to monitor 
compliance by industry operators with national policies, laws, regulations and agreements 
relating to petroleum activities.
30
  Also re-assigned to the Commission is the advisory role 
once ascribed to the GNPC under Section 2(3)(a) of PNDC 64. Under Act 821, part of the 
Commission‟s role is now to provide recommendations and advice to the relevant Minister on 
a wide range of issues relating to upstream petroleum development activities and policies.
31
 
From a regulatory perspective, the Act 821 represents a significant milestone in the legislative 
                                                          
25
 http://www.gnpcghana.com/operations.html accessed on 18 November 2016. 
26
 For a full list of the Commission‟s functions, see Section 3(a-n) of Act 821. 
27
 Act 821 Section 3(h). 
28
 Section 3(g). 
29
 Section 3(a). 
30
 Section 3(c).  
31
 Section 3(b) and (j). 
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framework which marks the evolution, and emergence, of the upstream petroleum industry in 
Ghana on the international stage.     
 
Also noteworthy during this phase is the Petroleum Authority Act of 2005 (Act 691), 
which has been amended by the Petroleum Authority Act of March 2016. The Act establishes 
the National Petroleum Authority which acts as the regulatory agency for the downstream oil 
industry in Ghana. The scope of this paper is limited to the upstream sector, hence the 
functions of the NPA will not be considered here in full.  
3. Act 919 of 2016 and associated instruments governing the 
contractual and fiscal regime 
 
The Petroleum (Exploration and Production) Act, 2016 [Act 919] represents the 
anchor and fulcrum of the legal framework governing the upstream petroleum industry in 
Ghana. The new legislation emanated from the Petroleum (Exploration and Production) Bill, 
after a troubled passage beset by many setbacks and delays following a lengthy period of 
consultation. Much of the misgivings and opposition to the bill, mainly from civil society 
organisations but also from legislators, centred on the proposed change from the production 
sharing contract under the old legislation (PNDC 64 and PNDC 84) to a hybrid system under 
the new law. The new contractual regime, the Ghana Royalty Tax/ Hybrid system, is a fiscal 
based system infused with minority state participation (represented by GNPC) on the basis of 
10-15% carried interest equity participation.
32
 The opposition to the new law, spearheaded by 
the Fair-Trade Oil Share-Ghana campaign, has continued even after the passage of the new 
law, whose enactment the group perceives to have proceeded with precipitate haste.
33
 They 
also argue that the many amendments at the bill stage (with more than 100 proposed 
amendments in the draft stage and a further 45 proposed amendments after the first reading of 
the bill) constitutes evidence of a tacit rejection of the new law by Ghanaian legislators.
34
 
However, it is important to point out that despite strident opposition in some quarters, many 
commentators have welcomed the enactment of the new Act. 
                                                          
32
 As seen above, Article 2.4 of MPA provides that GNPC shall have a 10% initial interest in all petroleum 
operations on a carried interest basis. Under current petroleum agreements such as the „TEN; project, the 
GNPC‟s participating interest is 15% (supra, note 11). 
33
 http://www.resourcegovernance.org/blog/ghanas-petroleum-exploration-and-production-bill-steps-forward-
room-improvement; accessed on 2 December 2016. 
34
 Ibid. 
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The advent of the new legislation has given rise to official and public optimism 
founded on the hope that the new Act will presage the advent of a new era for the petroleum 
industry in Ghana - with the upstream petroleum sector serving as a springboard for 
economic growth and the catalyst for the transition to an emerging economy. Act 919 
replicates some of the provisions of the MPA which govern the contractual and legal regime, 
as well as some of the fiscal provisions contained in earlier legislation and instruments which 
preceded the Act. This overlapping has given rise to some inconsistent provisions which will 
be highlighted as part of the discussion in a latter section of this paper.  
From a structural and organisational point of view, Act 919 comprises of 13 parts 
divided into 97 sections. For the purpose of this paper, the pertinent areas of the Act are Parts 
IV, V and VI 
35
 (Sections 10-37) which govern the contractual regime for exploration and 
production) and Part XII (Sections 85-89) which govern the fiscal regime. Also included in 
the discourse will be other relevant aspects such as environmental provisions and 
decommissioning. The analysis in this section of the paper will comprise of three main 
sections: the first part will examine the key principles of the new law; in the second part 
aspects relating to the contractual regime will be discussed alongside relevant provisions of 
the MPA, the JV Guidelines of 2016, and the Local Content and Local Participation 
Regulations, 2013 [L.I. 2204]. In the third part the fiscal provisions will be discussed together 
with relevant aspects of the Petroleum Income Tax Act, 1987 [PNDC 188], and the 
Petroleum Commission (Fees and Charges) Regulations, 2015 [L.I. 2221].  
    
3.1  Key principles and defining philosophy of Act 919 
The stated objective of Act 919 is to provide a robust legal and regulatory framework 
capable of meeting the challenges posed by the advent of a new era in the upstream 
petroleum industry in Ghana – to wit, the era of commercial production. Key amongst these 
challenges are financial and environmental factors, as well as deriving optimum benefits for 
the Ghanaian economy through local participation in upstream activities. The Act also seeks 
to ensure the maximum utilisation of local content/ materials in petroleum exploration and 
development activities. The guiding philosophy of Act 919 is thus to ensure the safe, secure, 
sustainable and efficient development of oil and gas resources, with the aim of achieving 
optimal long-term exploitation of deposits.
36
 The ultimate aspiration of the Act is the use of 
                                                          
35
 These parts have headings but are not numbered in the Act. The author‟s numbering here is done for the 
purposes of analytical convenience. 
36
 Section 2: “Object of the Act”. 
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petroleum revenues for the benefit and welfare of Ghanaian citizens, and for the advancement 
of inter-generational equity.   
The key principles informing the conception and the ethos of Act 919 can be identified as 
follows:  
 Sustainability: through the sound, efficient and secure management and exploitation 
of oil and gas resources, together with the avoidance of waste
37
, in order to ensure 
long term recovery of deposits in line with international best practice. Concerning the 
principle of efficiency, the Act mandates the coordination of petroleum development 
activities and the implementation of unitisation programmes where petroleum 
deposits straddle the common boundary of contract areas or blocks. This is with a 
view to ensuring optimum recovery through single unit operations from the common 
basin.
38
 The Act also legislates a minimum work obligation requirement during the 
exploration period, together with a corresponding minimum expenditure amount 
during each working period of the exploration phase.
39
 The financial penalty for 
failure to comply with the minimum work requirement is payment by the Contractor 
to the GNPC of a sum equivalent to the amount required to complete the unfulfilled 
portion of the work programme for the relevant working period.
40
 
 
 Principles of good governance and transparency41: the former is aimed at ensuring 
maximum returns and benefits to the local economy through the judicious utilisation 
of petroleum revenues. To this effect provisions promoting local participation,
42
 local 
content maximisation under a progressive 10-year plan,
43
 and the training and 
employment of Ghanaian citizens,
44
 all feature prominently in the Act. Furthermore, 
foreign oil companies are required under Regulation L.I. 2204 to incorporate a local 
                                                          
37
 To this effect Section 32 includes provisions on the utilisation of associated natural gas. Section 33 
complements this by incorporating restrictions on gas flaring. See also Article 14 of the MPA which outlines 
special provisions for natural gas. 
38
 Section 34. 
39
 Section 23(1) mirrors the provisions of Article 4 MPA on minimum exploration programme. 
40
 Section 23(2). 
41
 Section 4. See further K. Appiah-Adu and N.K. Appiah-Adu, “Towards Good governance in Ghana‟s 
Petroleum sector”, in K. Appiah-Adu (Ed.), supra, note 6, 79-88; and P.R.P. Heller, “Civil Society and the 
evolution of Accountability in the Petroleum sector”, in K. Appiah-Adu, ibid, 89-108. 
42
 For example, through local incorporation and joint venture partnership between foreign companies and 
indigenous Ghanaian enterprises: Section 70. See also the JV Guideline, 2016. 
43
 Sections 61-67, and Section 71. Also relevant in this regard are the Local Content and Local Participation 
Regulations, 2013 [L.I. 2204] 
44
 Section 60, in line with similar provisions in Article 21 MPA on employment and training of Ghanaian 
citizens in the upstream petroleum sector. 
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subsidiary in the form of a joint venture company, with at least 5% participation by an 
indigenous Ghanaian company.
45
 However, the JV Guidelines prescribe a minimum 
of 10% participation for indigenous companies.
46
  
The Ghana Petroleum Holding Funds and the Ghana Petroleum Funds concepts 
(which preceded Act 919) are equally informed by the need to promote good 
governance and generational equity in the management of petroleum resources.
47
 The 
principle of transparency, on the other hand, requires the Petroleum Commission to 
establish and maintain a public register of all petroleum agreements, licences, permits 
and authorisations.
48
 
    
 A conducive and enabling environment for attracting foreign direct invest (FDI): Act 
919 aims to attract private investors into the upstream oil and gas sector by attempting 
to introduce transparency in the licensing procedure. In furtherance of this objective, 
an open, competitive and transparent tender process serves as the prelude to entering 
into the petroleum agreement.
49
 Moreover, a new element has been introduced which 
did not exist under the previous petroleum regime – to wit, the requirement for the 
Minister to publish in the Gazette, and in at least two other State-owned national 
newspapers (or other medium of public communication), an invitation to tender or an 
invitation for direct negotiations.
50
 
 
There are, however, a number of developments associated with the Act which seem to be 
at odds, or in potential conflict, with the aspiration to attract FDI into the upstream petroleum 
sector for exploration and development. From an FDI perspective, this could be cause for 
concern to potential oil and investors from overseas. If incremental improvement is adopted 
as the yardstick for measuring the attractiveness of the new petroleum regime under Act 919 
over its predecessor, then the change from what was a contractual regime based on negotiated 
terms and conditions to an administrative licensing model (albeit with elements of 
transparency and negotiated residual terms) seem a retrogressive step. From a conceptual 
point of view, the licensing regime raises far more questions concerning security of tenure 
                                                          
45
 Section 4(2) of the Petroleum (Local Content and Local Participation) Regulations, 2013 (L.I.2204).  
46
 See JV Guidelines, Article 4.3. 
47
 Established under the Petroleum Revenue Management Act 2011 (Act 815) 
48
 Section 56. 
49
 Section 10(3). 
50
 Section 10(6). 
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than a contractual regime based on fully negotiated terms and conditions, and therefore 
subject to the sanctity of contract doctrine.  
Far from allaying these concerns, the stabilisation clause contained in Article 26.2 of 
MPA raises the spectre of a potential conflict with Section 20 of Act 919. Article 26.2 of 
MPA guarantees the stability of the terms and conditions of the petroleum agreement as at the 
effective date, including rights and obligations derived under relevant petroleum laws and 
regulations. It further provides that such rights acquired under the petroleum agreement shall 
not be modified, altered, amended or supplemented except on written agreement executed by 
the parties, and that any unilateral legislative or administrative act of the State or its agencies 
which purports to vary the terms of the agreement shall constitute a breach by the State 
party.
51
 Section 20 of Act 919, on the other hand, provides that a petroleum agreement may 
be reviewed by the parties where there is a material change in circumstances. Furthermore, 
any such review will be subject to ratification by Parliament in accordance with Article 268 
of the Constitution of Ghana where the review leads to a material change in terms and 
conditions.
52
 Admittedly, the review envisaged under Section 20 is predicated on mutual 
agreement of the parties. But this still raises the question as to what would transpire if the 
investor party objects to such a review by invoking the stabilisation clause under Article 26.2 
of MPA. 
The conception of Ghana‟s new petroleum regime under Act 919 draws not only on 
public consultations, but also on a review of international practices and industry lessons from 
as far afield as Alaska, Alberta, Azerbaijan, Nigeria, Norway, Sao Tome and Principe, and 
Trinidad and Tobago. The Norwegian model, in particular, appears to have exerted a defining 
influence on Ghana‟s policy makers53, with collaborative NORAD-Ghana projects aimed at 
identifying the most effective policies for Ghana‟s nascent petroleum industry.54 
 From a benchmarking perspective, the Chatham Guidelines provide a set of 
parameters generally considered by civil society organisations to be the hallmark of 
aspirations towards best practice in the extractive industries. The key Chatham benchmarks 
                                                          
51
 Article 26(2) MPA, 2000. See further C. Amankwah, “Issues of Stability in Ghana‟s Model Petroleum 
Agreement” (2014) 2:1 UKLSA Legal Issues Journal, 1-34.  
52
 Section 20(2). 
53
 See further A. Mensah, The Norwegian petroleum Experience: A Model for Ghana?  Masters Thesis, 
Norwegian University of Life Sciences, (2012). 
54
 A. Disch, O. Rasmussen and J. Asamoah, “Oil for Development Ghana, 2010-2014: Moving Towards a 
„Second Generation‟ Programme? A Review of Norway‟s Support to the Petroleum Industry in Ghana”, 
NORAD Collected Reviews, (2015).  ISBN: 978-82-7548-763-4. See also, OECD: “Breaking the Mineral and 
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are transparency in the licensing system, sustainability in the operation of upstream activities, 
and accountability in the management of petroleum revenues.  
Section 20(1) has also attracted criticism on account of the vagueness of the language 
employed to justify a potential review: to wit, material change of circumstances prevailing 
either at the time of the execution of the agreement, or at the time of the last review. Critics 
point out that Section 20 required the use of more explicit language in line with the Chatham 
House Guidelines for Good Governance in Emerging Oil and Gas Producers, which requires 
revision or renegotiation only in the event of extreme unfairness or destabilizing social or 
environmental factors.
55
 It is in view of this lack of detail in its articulation, together with the 
potential conflict with Article 26(1) of the MPA, that Section 20 could be said to fall short of 
the standards associated with international best practice. 
The guiding principles of Act 919 are contained in Part I (Sections 1-5) of the Act 
under “General Provisions”. Section 3 incorporates a standard provision assigning ownership 
or property to petroleum in situ to the Republic of Ghana - with title vested in the President 
on behalf of, and in trust for, the citizens of Ghana. Furthermore, the conduct of petroleum 
activities can only be undertaken under a duly authorised licence or petroleum agreement, 
and in accordance with applicable laws.
56
 
 
3.2  Provisions governing the contractual framework 
Section 9 of Act 919 prefaces the provisions on the contractual framework by 
outlining the requirements for the granting of a reconnaissance licence. The latter confers on 
the licensed person a non-exclusive right to undertake seismic surveying, data collection and 
shallow drilling with a view to processing, interpretation and evaluation of the petroleum data 
collected from the licensed contract area. Under Section 9(3), the Minister may in special 
cases grant an exclusive right to undertake reconnaissance activity, but without prejudice to 
any proprietary rights which the State may have in relation to the data collected. The 
reconnaissance licence is granted for an initial period of 3 years, renewable for a maximum 
period of 2 years.
57
 It is normally issued for an area which is not already covered by a 
petroleum agreement or authorisation.
58
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Section 10-20 contain provisions governing the petroleum agreement, whose normal 
duration is 25 years.
59
 The petroleum agreement shall only be entered into following an open 
and transparent process of competitive public tender, except where the Minister decides 
otherwise.
60
 As seen above, as part of the transparency initiative all invitations to tender or 
for direct negotiations shall be published in the Gazette and other communication media.
61
 
Section 10(13) requires the ratification of all petroleum agreements by the Ghanaian 
Parliament in line with Section 268 of the Constitution. The contract area covered by the 
petroleum agreement may consist of a single block, of multiple blocks, or of part(s) of a 
single block.
62
 The remaining sections of Part IV contain standard provisions on involvement 
in petroleum activities by the Corporation (GNPC);
63
 Ministerial approval of operators;
64
 
change of operator or sub-contractor ownership;
65
 assignment of licence rights;
66
 sub-
contracting;
67
 pre-emption;
68
 transfers of assets to the Corporation;
69
 and stipulations on the 
review of licence terms and conditions.
70
 
 Provisions governing the contractual aspects of exploration are outlined in Sections 
21-25 of the Act. Under section 21(1) the stipulated exploration period is a maximum of 7 
years from the effective date of the petroleum agreement entering in force. This period may 
be extended in exceptional circumstances, or if a discovery is made in the seventh year, in 
order to allow sufficient time for an appraisal as to whether the discovery constitutes a 
commercial deposit.
71
 These provisions mirror Article 3 of the MPA, albeit the latter is more 
detail in providing for an “Initial Exploration Period” of 7 years followed by a “First 
Extension Period” and a “Second Extension Period”, and where applicable, further 
extensions. The exploration agreement is automatically terminated at the end of the 7 years 
period if no commercial discovery is made and no application for an extension of the 
exploration period has been made by the Contractor.
72
 Section 22 prescribes the requirements 
for relinquishment of part, or of the whole, of the exploration acreage.  Article 5.1 of MPA 
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further prescribes the portions of the contract area to be relinquished: at least 50% of acreage 
(as at the effective date of the petroleum agreement) at the start of the first extension period 
and at least 75% (as at the effective date) at the commencement of the second extension 
period. 
 Section 23 contain provisions stipulating the minimum work obligations for the 
exploration period, with a corresponding minimum expenditure amount which shall be 
specified in the petroleum agreement. In line with Section 23 of Act 919, Article 4.1 of the 
MPA requires that exploration operations should begin expeditiously and no later than 60 
days after the effective date. Furthermore, Article 4.2 contains an outline template or draft 
schedule for the minimum exploration programme for each phase of exploration work. The 
template includes requirements to specify the description of work (including minimum depth 
of wells), and the minimum expenditure for the period. Under Article 4.4, the drilling of 
appraisal wells and seismic surveys conducted as part of appraisal programmes do not count 
towards fulfilment of minimum work obligations. Section 24 of the Act provides for 
exploration drilling by the Contractor (pursuant to a drilling permit obtained for the Ghana 
Petroleum Commission) to be in line with statutory requirements of the Environmental 
Protection Agency Act, 1994 (Act 490). Section 25 completes the provisions on exploration 
with stipulations on petroleum discovery and appraisal. Under this section written notification 
containing all relevant information shall be made by the Contractor to the Minister within 48 
hours of the discovery
73
, followed by the submission of a programme and schedule for the 
effective appraisal of the discovery to determine its commerciality.
74
 
 Arguably the most significant phase of upstream operations, oilfield development and 
production are regulated by Sections 26-37 of Act 919, in conjunction with relevant 
provisions of the MPA. Section 26 reinforces the principle of sustainability by prescribing the 
prudent exploitation of deposits in line with international best practice. The Contractor is thus 
under an obligation to adopt techniques and strategies aimed at optimising petroleum 
recovery, including the avoidance of waste or untimely depletion through loss of reservoir 
energy. In line with these obligations, the Contractor is required to submit to the Minister a 
plan outlining the proposed development programme prior to commencing production 
operations.
75
 The plan, to which an approved environmental report should be appended, 
covers a wide range of operational matters including, inter alia: information on 
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commerciality and proven reserves; technical and safety factors; geological parameters and 
reservoir engineering methodology; proposed drilling and completion plans; financing plan; 
long term production schedule; fiscal metering systems, and local content plans.
76
  
Further to the GNPC‟s initial carried interest, Article 6 of MPA provides for the 
establishment of a Joint Management Committee (JMC) between the GNPC and the 
Contractor no later than 30 days from the effective date of the petroleum agreement.
77
 As a 
complement to Section 26 of Act 919, Article 6.5 of the MPA requires the Contractor to 
submit an appraisal plan within 60 days of a commercial discovery, followed by the 
submission (within 90 days of the commencement of each calendar year) of a work 
programme and budget detailing development and production plans for the forthcoming 
calendar year. The Contractor is also required to submit to the JMC for approval an annual 
production schedule within 60 days of the commencement of commercial production.
78
 
Section 28 of the Act outlines the grounds on which a development and operations 
plan may be rejected by the Minister. These grounds include failure by the Contractor to 
comply with the principle of sustainability (i.e. efficient, beneficial and timely production); 
insufficient financial resources; lack of technical competence and experience to undertake 
effective development and production; failure to comply with relevant conditions, such as 
local content requirements; or inadequate insurance coverage. The Minister also has the 
power to postpone development, if such postponement is deemed to be in the national 
interest.
79
 The effect of the postponement on the petroleum agreement is to suspend the 
obligation to pay acreage fees, while extending the term of the agreement to compensate for 
the period of the postponement. Sections 30 and 31 contain standard provisions governing the 
issuing of annual permits and approvals for the commencement of petroleum production. 
Sections 32-35 deal with matters relating to the utilisation of associated natural gas, and 
cross-border cooperation and unitisation of common deposits. Section 36 makes provision for 
third party use of facilities, and Section 37 completes stipulations on the contractual 
framework with standard provisions on the measurement of petroleum produced in the 
contract area.
80
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The relationship between the licensing system and the JV agreement lies in the fact 
that the latter provides a vehicle for the actualisation of a key licensing condition, which is 
the putting in place of the PSC component of the hybrid system in the event of a successful 
bid. But as the name suggests, the JV guidelines are in effect a form of non-binding „soft law‟ 
which are intended to complement the legally binding framework. As stated in its Article 10, 
the provisions are intended to „guide‟ upstream industry operators on the formation, structure 
and activities of JV companies.  The main aspiration of the JV guidelines is to create an 
enabling environment for effective indigenous participation in petroleum operations, thus 
enhancing „local content‟ in the upstream industry.  In view of its legal status as a „guide‟, the 
unavoidable conclusion would be that in the event of a conflict between its provisions and 
those of a legally binding instrument such as the 2013 Regulations (an addendum to Act 821), 
the provisions of latter would take precedence over the guidelines.  Such would the case 
therefore, with some of the inconsistencies (identified as part of this discourse) between the 
JV Guidelines and legally binding statutory instruments.  
 
  3.3.  Provisions relating to the fiscal regime 
Act 919 confers a statutory status on the pre-existing fiscal regime for the upstream 
petroleum industry in Ghana. It enacts into law the previous regime whose chief hallmarks 
were flexibility and negotiation, rather than rigid legislative prescriptions. The main 
components of the fiscal regime comprise of petroleum royalties, petroleum income tax, 
capital gains tax, participating interest and bonus payments.
81
 Sections 85-89 of the Act, 
which govern the fiscal regime, are in effect consolidating measures which affirm the fiscal 
arrangements contained in previous legal instruments. Most notable amongst these are the 
Petroleum Income Tax Act, 1987 [PNDC 188] and the Petroleum Commission (Fees and 
Charges) Regulations, 2015 [L.I. 2221].  
The royalty rate, representing a percentage of gross volume of petroleum production, 
is not fixed (unlike the mining sector which has had a fixed rate of 5% since 2010). For the 
upstream petroleum sector royalty payments range from 4% - 12.5% for oil production, and 
3% - 10% for gas production.
82
 A specific royalty rate is negotiated between the Contractor 
and the State party for each petroleum agreement. It could be argued that this approach 
represents a double-edged sword; while it provides flexibility in pre-contract negotiations, 
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there is nonetheless an inherent degree of uncertainty as to the precise fiscal obligations of 
the Contractor prior to the conclusion of the petroleum agreement.  
Section 85 of Act 919 contains general provisions relating to the payment of 
petroleum royalties. Under Section 85(3), payment of royalty shall be in kind - unless the 
Minister makes a written request to the Contractor for payment to be made in cash. Where 
payment is in kind, the Minister may instruct the Contractor to undertake transportation of 
royalty petroleum from the contract area, and the subsequent processing and storage thereof, 
pursuant to Section 85(4) of the Act. 
The Petroleum Income Tax Act (PNDC 188) sets a default rate of 50% for petroleum 
income tax, unless the petroleum agreement provides for an alternative rate of income tax.
83
 
In practice, the petroleum income tax rate has been set at a much lower rate of 35% for 
petroleum agreements signed for currently producing oilfields such as Jubilee, TEN and 
OCTP. This rate of 35%, although lower that the 50% rate prescribed by Section 6 of PNDC 
188, is nonetheless 10% higher than the standard corporation tax rate of 25% under the 
Income Tax Act of 2015 [Act 896].
84
  
Section 3 of PNDC 188 identifies various deductions from gross petroleum income 
for the purpose of computing taxable income; these deductions shall comprise of “… all 
outgoings and expenses wholly, exclusively and necessarily incurred … for the purpose of 
petroleum operations during the year of assessment.” Included in these deductions are rental 
charges; royalty payments; interests, fees and charges payable on loans or debts, and on 
capital employed for petroleum operations; any expenses incurred for repair to plant, 
machinery, premises or fixtures used in petroleum operations; etc. These petroleum income 
tax obligations, together with the payment of capital gains tax, are affirmed by Section 87 of 
Act 919.
85
 
Act 919 also makes provision for the payment of annual acreage (or surface rental) 
fees, whose amount shall be prescribed by the Minister or in the terms of the petroleum 
agreement.
86
 The Contractor‟s fiscal obligations also extend to bonus payments,87 
withholding tax on sub-contractors, and additional oil entitlement (AOE) by the State party to 
a portion of the Contractor‟s share of petroleum production.88 The AOE is triggered if the 
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Contractor‟s post-tax rate of return (ROR) exceeds the prescribed target for that year. The 
trigger points for the AOE are 12.5%, 17.5%, 22.5% and 27.5% ROR.
89
 
Details of other fees and charges, such as application fees, bidding and permit fees, 
permit renewal charges, fees and charges relating to applications for extension of exploration 
working period or extension of appraisal period, and other sundry levies are all outlined in the 
Petroleum Commission (Fees and Charges) Regulations, 2015 [L.I. 2221]. 
 
 3.4.  Other noteworthy provisions of Act 919. 
It is beyond the remit of this article to examine all the provisions of the new Act. In 
concluding this part of the discourse, it is therefore proposed to summarise some of the main 
parts of the Act in order to provide a more comprehensive picture of its contents. Part VII 
(Sections 38-42) include provisions governing the transportation, treatment and storage of 
crude petroleum products. Part VIII (Sections 43-49) deals with cessation of petroleum 
activities in the contract area, decommissioning (including the establishment of the 
decommissioning fund), plugging and abandonment of disused wells, and the removal of 
equipment and facilities. Part IX (Sections 50-72) prescribes general requirements for the 
conduct of petroleum activities in the contract area, in particular operating standards and 
matters relating to ownership and storage of petroleum data, geological samples and other 
relevant information.  
Part X (Sections 73-80) regulates matters relating to health and safety, as well as 
security and environmental protection, by outlining safety requirements and standards, and 
emergency preparedness. Prescribed safety measures include the establishment of safety 
zones and the suspension of petroleum activities following an emergency.
90
 Part XI (Sections 
81-84) complements the preceding part by prescribing measures and principles aimed at 
ensuring environmental protection. These measures include environmental impact 
assessment, environmental liability, and compensation for pollution damage. Part XIII 
(Sections 90-97) concludes the Act with miscellaneous provisions, chief among which are 
stipulations on natural resources other than petroleum found in the contract area, matters 
relating to insurance, and standard interpretation guidelines.
91
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In the next section, the nature of the hybrid petroleum regime will be examined, 
together with its historical background influences, rationale and key features. 
4. The Ghana royalty Hybrid Petroleum Regime: influences, 
rationale and main features. 
 
The pre-Act 919 legal framework for petroleum exploration and production in Ghana, 
put in place by PNDC 84, was an essentially contractual regime based on two elements: 
royalty payments, and production sharing. The new hybrid regime under Act 919 adds to the 
old regime a new feature, a pre-contractual bidding system. This brings to the new regime an 
administrative licensing component which in effect serves the function of pre-qualification 
for the second phase, which comprises of a contractually negotiated PSA.  
  
4.1. Background to the hybrid regime:  twin influences of administrative 
licensing/ permits and the contractual regime. 
 
The administrative permit licensing system for petroleum or mineral development is 
closely associated with the concessionary regime, with its roots in the French civil law 
concept of the contrat adminsitratif.
92
 Petroleum exploration and production rights under the 
permit or licensing system, being in the nature of an administrative grant, are subject to the 
“clauses exhorbitantes de droit commun”.93 Under this concept, the petroleum permit or 
licence is in effect a public law instrument, and is thus in principle subject to the exclusive 
jurisdiction of national law (including the municipal competences of domestic courts) in the 
event of a dispute between the between the IOC and the host State. As Riad points out, “… 
the public power is omnipresent and constitutes a predominant factor … this reality is clearly 
reflected in the French terminology of „convention d’etablissement‟”.94  
Compared with the PSC regime which seeks to regulate the legal and fiscal, as well as 
the commercial aspects of the petroleum development project, the administrative licensing or 
permit regime has a more limited scope which incorporates the legal and fiscal elements, but 
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not the commercial dimension of the project. It could thus be argued that the permit system 
affords the international oil company (IOC) more scope and liberty in the conduct of oil 
operations through minimal involvement by the host State, except for standard regulatory 
matters such as collection of royalty payments, acreage rental fees and other taxes - as well as 
environmental protection measures. Nonetheless, the „pouvoirs exhorbitantes‟ (public 
powers) concept of administrative law implies that the State could intervene (by way of 
administrative fiat) to unilaterally amend terms and conditions. This is by virtue of the non-
contractual nature of the relationship between the host State and the licensee, a prospect 
which in turn raises questions concerning the stability of the fiscal regime.
95
 It is for this 
reason that hybrid systems, such as the current Ghanaian model, seek to provide some 
measure of assurance to the IOC partner by complementing the licensing regime with 
contractually negotiated terms and conditions. 
As a legal framework governing the relationship between petroleum or mineral 
investors and host States, the petroleum sharing contract or agreement (PSC/ PSA) represents 
the epitome of the contractual model. Originating in Indonesia where it was first introduced 
in 1966, the PSC has since become the most commonly used  type of petroleum regime in the 
world.
96
 From the perspective of an oil producing country such as Ghana, the PSC is intended 
to achieve three main objectives: 
a) Politically, to serve as an acceptable and convenient vehicle for promoting the 
concept of national sovereignty over oil resources through the active 
participation of indigenous enterprises, including State-owned enterprises 
(SOEs), in the exploitation of petroleum resources in partnership with foreign 
capital (represented by IOCs).  To serve this function, a JV agreement is 
usually grafted on to the platform of the PSC. In doing this, the PSC model 
seeks to address one of the perceived shortcomings of the old concession and 
permit/ licensing systems, under which production rights are the exclusive 
preserve of the concession or permit holder, with no avenue for local 
participation. The PSC thus affords to the host country the opportunity to 
exercise a greater degree of authority and control over the management of oil 
operations within the framework of the associated JV agreement.  
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b) From a legal perspective, the PSC serves the function of a contractual vehicle 
for the JV partnership between the State party (SOE) and the IOC. It is to be 
observed in this regard that the JV model used for the upstream petroleum 
industry in Ghana is a combination of „carried interest‟ (contractual) and „sole 
risk account‟ (equity) joint venture.97 The sole risk account of Ghana‟s SOE 
(GNPC) is activated when the contractor (IOC) declines to pursue an interest 
in a particular oil project which the GNPC wishes to embark on. 
c) From an economic perspective, the PSC is intended to maximise host state 
benefits through its share of oil production from the joint venture, an 
additional benefit not available under a royalty and tax-based concession, 
licensing or permit system.  
 At first sight the PSC appears to be a basic partnership or production sharing 
arrangement between the host State and a private sector company. However, as argued by 
Bindeman, in its operational aspects it is often a highly complex legal relationship, 
incorporating components such a risk-reward allocation mechanisms, principal-agent 
relationships, and even what may be regarded as elements of sharecropping.
98
   The 
acquisition of contractual or equity interests by the host State is often in exchange for 
contractually negotiated incentives offered to the IOC investor.
99
 These may include 
internationalisation of the dispute settlement mechanism through choice of forum and 
applicable law provisions
100
, as well as the inclusion of stabilisation clauses.
101
  From a 
theoretical and conceptual point of view, the PSC can be said to be much more amenable to a 
renegotiation of terms than the permit or licence by virtue of its contractual character. 
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4.2. Rationale for the Hybrid System 
 
Bespoke hybrid petroleum regimes are representative of efforts by oil producers to 
manage some of the inherent tensions and potential conflicts associated with the design of 
upstream petroleum projects.  As observed by Tordo, despite the common goal of generating 
high levels of income which is the shared aspiration both host States and IOCs, there is often 
a misalignment of objectives between the two parties. This is because host States tend to aim 
for a maximisation of rental income and the pursuit of other socio-economic goals, including 
long term sustainability in the exploitation of finite resources.
102
 The IOCs‟ main aim, on the 
other hand, is to ensure an appropriate return on investment commensurate with project-
associated risks and other strategic commercial objectives.  However, project revenues under 
a licensing/ permit based system usually tend to fall short of satisfying the host country‟s 
aspirations. It is for this reason that novel and innovative forms of contractual, fiscal and 
institutional arrangements have been sought by countries for upstream petroleum 
development, hence the emergence of hybrid petroleum regimes. 
103
  
Considering the foundational principles and ethos of Act 919, it could be argued that 
the statute places Ghana‟s petroleum regime within the group of countries seeking such 
innovative arrangements. In the case of Ghana‟s hybrid system, a combination of licensing 
and production sharing ensures that the publicity surrounding the initial bidding process 
attracts a wider audience of potential bidders through a transparent process than would be the 
case with a purely contract-based system founded on discreet (individual) enquires or private 
negotiations. It also ensures the maximisation of revenues through associated fees and 
charges in the licensing round.
104
 In the case of Ghana, the PSC-JV agreements complement 
the licensing process with a contractual component. This ostensibly introduces to the hybrid 
regime a greater degree of efficacy and robustness - with State control exercised through the 
licensing system, while the contractual phase ensures for the IOC partner an effective 
contribution to project design through negotiated terms and conditions.  
The increasing diversity of petroleum regimes worldwide, coupled with the necessity 
for each country to tailor its legal framework for petroleum exploration and production to suit 
its particular geological conditions, political circumstances and economic strategy, provides a 
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sound rationale for a bespoke Ghanaian model with its emphasis on accountability, 
transparency and participation by indigenous enterprises in upstream petroleum activities 
through the JV platform.  However, the Ghanaian approach is not without its associated risks. 
For whereas the hybrid system may afford Ghana income generation opportunities on a 
number of fronts (royalties, acreage fees, AOE, etc.), it also exposes Ghanaian petroleum 
agreements to the twin risks of both fiscal and contractual instability; it may also lead to a 
weakening of bargaining power in any ensuing contractual negotiations following a relatively 
poor or failed licensing/ bidding round. It is perhaps by dint of these multiple risks that 
internationally, the hybrid system and its variants continue to lag behind the number of 
concession agreement, PSCs, and JVAs as the preferred form of oil regime.
105
 
 
4.3. The Ghanaian Model: A bespoke regime? 
 
The Ghanaian hybrid regime this represents a blend of licencing procedures, royalty 
payments, and production sharing. This particular version of the hybrid system has previously 
been used in a number of countries including Gabon, Malaysia, Pakistan and Vietnam.
106
 A 
derivative of the original Indonesian PSA, Ghana‟s hybrid system seeks to maximise national 
benefits through a combination of royalty payments, acreage fees and a share of oil 
production. From a conceptual point of view, it represents a mix of features from the 
concession regime (acreage fees), administrative licence/ permit regime (through the bidding 
process), and the PSC regime (post bidding negotiated terms and conditions specific to each 
oil agreement).       
The authorisation of upstream activities commences with a bidding process similar to 
the permit/ licensing procedure under the concession system. Relevant industry experience, 
technical expertise and financial resources serve as key criteria for pre-selection. The royalty 
component, together with acreage rental fees, are the principal fiscal features of the licensing 
process, with successful bids subsequently serving as the platform for a contractually 
negotiated PSC. It is thus this second stage in licensing process which introduces a 
contractual element to Ghana‟s hybrid regime. The PSC itself is constructed on the 
foundation of a JV agreement, with the MPA and JV Guidelines providing both guidance and 
key parameters for any ensuing petroleum agreement.  
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In the event that no successful bids are received (or if no bids are received), the 
Minister may resort to the statutory authority conferred under Section 10.5 of Act 919 to 
enter into direct negotiations with suitably qualified potential contractors. This contractual 
„safety net‟ thus serves as a „reserve‟ position which can be deployed to the complement the 
bidding. It offers some measure of flexibility, and reassurance, in the event of an 
unproductive licensing round. However, the authorisation process confers far too much 
power and discretion in the person of the Minister for Petroleum. There is a danger that the 
process could become hostage to the personal whims and caprices of a particular individual. 
There is therefore an argument to be made for a more institutionalised approach which would 
remove the mandate of direct negotiations (devoid of licensing) from the office of the 
Minister and place it under the remit of a relevant institution such as the Ghana Petroleum 
Commission, complemented by parliamentary oversight. 
The new petroleum regime of Ghana can more appropriately be described as a ‟hybrid 
system with special provisions for natural gas‟.107 This is in view of the stipulations contained 
in Section 32 of Act 919 and Article 14 of MPA regarding the production and disposal of 
associated natural gas. Other variants of the hybrid regime used in countries such as Angola, 
Bangladesh and Nigeria do not include specific obligations relating to the production and 
disposal of associated natural gas, leading to the practice of natural gas flaring and its 
associated environmental problems.  
 
4.4. A Comparative Perspective 
 
Under the current system, the State-owned GNPC plays a pivotal role as the local JV 
partner in major upstream projects such as the Jubilee and TEN projects (the absence of any 
significant involvement by Ghanaian private sector in upstream petroleum activities raises 
questions regarding the effectiveness of Ghana‟s much lauded aspirations towards enhancing 
local content through indigenous participation). GNPC‟s carried interest in the majority of 
projects introduces an element of risk service contracting to the JV arrangement, a view 
supported by the designation of the IOC as „contractor‟ under both the MPA and JV 
Guidelines.  Viewed from this perspective, the Ghanaian model shares some similarities with 
China‟s hybrid system of the 1990s. Under the Chinese model, IOCs were required to enter 
into partnerships with a select number of Chinese SOEs (popularly known as the “three 
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barrels”) utilising the PSC platform. Under the Chinese system exclusive rights to exploration 
and production were assigned to the local Chinese partner, with the IOC in the role of 
contractor – in effect a risk service contract with payment to the contract in cash or kind.108 
On closer examination, Ghana‟s hybrid system can be said to differ from the Chinese model. 
Under the Ghanaian regime, although title to oil and gas in situ is vested in the State, Article 
10.1 MPA provides for produced crude oil to be distributed amongst the parties in line with 
their “participating interests” – hence ruling out a risk service contract model.  
 
4.5. Allocation of Production under the Ghana Hybrid Regime. 
 
By combining references to participating oil (contractual) with provisions on equity 
oil entitlement or AOE by GNPC by virtue of its sole risk account, Article 10.1(a-c) MPA is 
reflection of the mix of contractual and equity JV features of the Ghanaian regime. The 
allocation of production is based on the following sequencing: 12.5% as royalty oil from 
gross production; recovery of „cost oil‟ by contractor (as opposed to a service fee under the 
risk service regime); AOE out of contractor‟s share of profit oil; and corporation tax on profit 
oil.
109
 
 
4.6. An Appraisal of Ghana’s Royalty-Hybrid Petroleum Regime. 
 
What distinguishes Ghana from other developing and emerging petroleum economies 
is the enhanced level of transparency through public engagement and citizen participation in 
the both the formulation of upstream industry policies, including the monitoring of 
exploration and production activities by civil society organisations.
110
 This fact is most 
evident in the wide ranging public consultations and the pro-active involvement of civil 
society organisations in the legislative process which preceded the adoption of Act 919. This 
is remarkable for an industry which, in a developing country, usually serves as the exclusive 
fiefdom of the political classes - with the population excluded from participation in industry 
matters and from gaining access to its benefits. 
In summing up this section, it can be argued that Act 919 represents a key stage in the 
evolution of Ghana‟s legal framework for the upstream petroleum industry. Its main strength 
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lies in in its attempts to embed aspects of good governance such as the principles of 
accountability, transparency and citizen participation in the shaping of oil industry policies 
through what appears to be a robust system of public consultation. Despite some of its 
perceived shortcomings (for example, it could be argued that too much authority and 
discretion is conferred on the Minister under Act 919), the new regime, together with its 
complementary instruments, can be said to represent a reasonably robust legal framework. It 
is thus submitted that Act 919 represents a progressive step in the petroleum policies and 
energy ambitions of Ghana.  
5. Flexibility at the expense of certainty? An appraisal of Act 919 
and future prospects.  
To an outside observer, Ghana‟s current legal framework for upstream petroleum 
operations presents a seemingly bewildering maze of interlocking legislative and regulatory 
instruments. It can be a cumbersome and difficult regulatory environment to navigate. There 
are many overlapping provisions, giving rise to seemingly inconsistent stipulations. An 
illustrative example such inconsistency are the various provisions on local participation: 
Article 4.3 of the JV Guidelines of 2016 stipulates a minimum of 10% local equity 
participation, whereas Section 4.2 of the Petroleum (Local Content and Local Participation) 
Regulations, 2013 (L.I.2004) requires a minimum of 5% local equity participation. There are 
also redundant provisions in some of the instruments, including references to the previous 
(now repealed) petroleum law PNDC 84 in the following statutes: Act 821 of 2011, refers to 
PNDC 84 in Section 3(f) and Section 23; same with Act 815 of 2011, (in Section 61(a) and 
(b)); and PNDC 188 of 1987: in Section 38(1) and (2).
111
  There is, therefore, a need for 
streamlining and tidying up of the old the legal framework in line with Section 97 of Act 919 
which repeals PNDC 84. 
Flexibility seems to be the hallmark not only of Act 919, but of the Ghanaian legal 
framework as a whole. This evidenced in particular in the flexible approach to fiscal terms 
(royalty rate, taxation), and in provisions relating to GNPC‟s participating interests. All of 
these aspects are outlined in legislation only in generic terms, with the specific details left to 
the negotiated terms of each petroleum agreement. This flexibility does have its advantages. 
However, it could also be to the detriment of clarity, predictability and certainty. It could 
even be argued that the approach falls short of the principles of international best practice, to 
which Ghana aspires. In line with international best practice, Precept 4 of the Natural 
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Resources Charter states that detail fiscal rules should be established in law and be readily 
available to investors and to the public.
112
 It further posits that bespoke fiscal arrangements 
based on contractual negotiations may place an onerous administrative burden on officials 
and negotiators. It could also lead to competition amongst investor with a view to securing 
the best or most preferential fiscal terms. Precept 3 of the Natural Resources Charter also 
recommends a pre-qualification criterion as a pre-requisite to granting a reconnaissance 
licence. This is in order to ensure that potential bidders have the required technical and 
financial capacity. However, Section 9 of Act 919 makes no provision for pre-qualification as 
a criterion for the reconnaissance licence. The provision could thus be argued to fall of 
international best practice.  
Section 56 of Act 919 requires the maintenance of a public register of petroleum 
agreements, licences, permits and authorisations. However, it does not provide details as to 
what type of information should be included in the register. Will the exercise, for instance, be 
restricted to just a simple list of agreements, or full text copies of agreements (including 
terms and conditions, and any subsequent amendments to such terms)? The principles of 
accountability and transparency would require the latter in line with international best 
practice.  
On the positive side, it could be argued that the legislative framework as a whole 
provides a viable platform for Ghana‟s nascent petroleum industry. A key concern has now 
been addressed though the reassignment of the putative regulatory role previously earmarked 
for the GNPC, which had raised questions of a potential conflict vis-à-vis its role as 
regulatory and participant. The regulatory role now comes under the remit of the Ghana 
Petroleum Commission. There are also been a great deal of disenchantment and criticism 
amongst civil society organisations in Ghana concerning the hybrid system, together with a 
seeming preference for the PSA form of agreement. However, it could be argued that the 
PSA, or any other form of agreement, does not per se guarantee the success of a petroleum 
regime. Rather, it is the substantive provisions of the particular agreement, combined with the 
judicious and conscientious management of oil revenues, which hold the key to a successful 
oil economy. Substance, rather than form, should be the overriding concern. At this relatively 
early stage in its development, the hybrid system could well provide the required scope for 
attracting FDI into Ghana‟s upstream petroleum industry.  The PSA could be a model to 
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consider when Ghana attains a higher level of production, together with enhanced bargaining 
power. 
 
6. Optimism underneath the Ever-present Shadow of the Resource 
Curse Thesis? 
Ghanaians live with the knowledge that their newly found wealth could in the long term 
turn out to be either a blessing, or a curse. There has already been a great deal of soul-
searching discourse on the susceptibility of Ghana‟s oil and mineral economy to the resource 
curse thesis,
113
 or its counterpart, the „Dutch disease‟. Such discourse has included the 
identification of possible strategies for avoiding the syndrome.
114
 The resource curse thesis 
itself, which seek to diagnose, explain and understand the paradox of „poverty in the midst of 
plenty‟ (i.e. why some countries with an abundance of renewable natural resources tend to 
experience poor economic growth and resource-based conflict) has been widely hypothesised 
in economic literature.
115
 However, there are dissenting scholars who, in the absence of 
irrefutable proof or compelling evidence, are not convinced about the existence or presence 
of the resource curse as a factual in explaining poor economic performance.
116
 As a 
hypothesis, the thesis nonetheless provides a persuasive paradigm for understanding the 
contradiction of intractable conflicts and dire economic situations of many developing 
countries which are endowed with abundant natural resources. Furthermore, this counter-
intuitive process of growth in resource-rich countries has to some extent been supported by 
empirical studies conducted by Sachs and Warner, whose findings revealed a strong 
correlation between abundant natural resources endowment and poor economic growth.
117
 
From the perspective of Ghana and its newly found oil wealth, interest in the resource 
curse thesis should lie not so much in its foreboding, as in seeking to fully understand its 
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causes, symptoms and manifestations. This requires learning from the economic literature 
and drawing lessons from the revealing experiences of other countries. This process of 
informed engagement and acute awareness should permit Ghana to gradually formulate 
adequate responses and policies which, in the long term, can be effective in shielding the 
country from the debilitating effects of the resource curse syndrome.
118
 
As for the perceived causes, the first sign to watch out for is conflict between the State 
and foreign oil contractors or multinational corporations over control and management of 
resources. At the macro-economic level, an over-reliance or extreme dependence on resource 
revenues should be avoided. This is in view of the volatility and vicissitudes of global oil 
markets. Equally to be monitored, and controlled, is a policy of over-reliance on imported 
goods and services - which can have economically debilitating impacts. A sustainable policy 
of diversification of the economic base, and capacity building of human resources, is required 
to counter a tendency towards oil dependency. Rather worryingly for Ghana, a low savings 
rate (one of the chief symptoms of the resource curse hypothesis) is already being 
experienced despite its new found oil wealth. This is evidenced in the systematic drawdowns 
which are becoming a familiar feature of the operation of the funds. This symptom, together 
with its underlying cause, will need addressing as a matter of urgency.  
The most virulent symptoms of the resource curse syndrome manifest themselves in 
the form of endemic political corruption, entrenched economic deprivation of the masses and 
environmental degradation.
119
 This is often accompanied by poor governance, democratic 
disenfranchisement and political instability - leading to increasingly authoritarian and 
dictatorial tendencies on the part of the governing class.
120
 The consequences, as in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo and in Nigeria, can be resource conflict in the form of civil or 
sectarian armed violence. This in turn could ultimately lead to a breakdown in law and order, 
collapse of national institutions, and an erosion of state authority – to wit, a failed state.121   
Policies aimed at increasing average incomes, and providing economic opportunities 
for all sections of  Ghanaian society, thus provide the key to unlocking the illogical puzzle 
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posed by the conundrum which represents the paradox of „poverty in the midst of plenty‟.122 
The principles of good governance, accountability and transparency, which have all been 
embedded in Act 919, provide a good foundation for addressing some of the causes of the 
hypothesis. Democratic institutions and processes will need to be further strengthened. 
Critical to this process will be the role of civil society organisations and NGOs particularly in 
ensuring accountability, transparency and dispute resolution vis-à-vis environmental or other 
resources-related conflicts.  
Ghana is endowed with seemingly favourable geological prospects.
123
 However, the 
exploration history to date is yet to live up to industry expectations of a prolific oil producing 
province. New discoveries such as the Jubilee oilfield could well signal a turn-around in 
Ghana‟s fortunes. Act 919 heralds a future filled with much hope and promise, but also with 
potential pitfalls and dangers, amongst which are the revenue instability caused by oil price 
fluctuations. There also seems to be an expectation, or presumption, on the part of officials 
that the advent of Act 919 will automatically lead to an inflow of FDI into the oil sector. 
Further progress on the exploration and production front will thus depend on substantial 
investments, not just from small or medium sized companies, but also from some of the 
major oil multinationals. 
Whether or not the country will one day be able to match the production capacity of 
some of the more established oil producers in the region such as the Republic of Congo 
(239,000 bpd), Gabon (240,000 bpd) and Equatorial Guinea 242,000 bpd) – or even major 
producers such as Angola (1.7 million bpd) and Nigeria (2.4 million bpd)
124
 – remains to be 
seen. What is certain is that an enabling legal environment, together with an efficient and 
judicious regulatory framework, will continue to play a pivotal role in promoting 
economically sound and environmentally sustainable petroleum development. Informing this 
process will be lessons drawn from mature oil provinces and international best practices.  
Ghana‟s optimism is neither ill-conceived nor misplaced. Its policy makers and 
citizens have every reason to nurture positive hopes and expectations from increased oil 
production. Given the right policies, Ghana has good prospects of emerging from underneath 
the shadow of the oil curse syndrome. In this regard, the country can perhaps draw some 
measure of comfort (but devoid of complacency) from the knowledge that the resource curse 
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syndrome is neither ubiquitous nor universal;
125
 nor is it an inevitable by-product of an 
abundance in natural resources endowment.
126
 Like a parasitic infection, it requires an 
acquiescent and compliant host country with an accommodating environment defined by 
permissive conditions. The first step towards combating the scourge will be an awareness 
(and acceptance) of its existence, followed by the formulation and implementation of 
effective avoidance strategies. Ghana has the added advantage of its own experiences from 
the gold mining industry, from which it can draw historic lessons. 
 
7. Conclusion 
Act 919 is in essence a consolidating statute. Most of the principles it encapsulates are 
concepts which had already been enshrined in previous legislative and regulatory 
instruments, or otherwise existed in contracting and licensing practice (as is the case with the 
hybrid system which pre-dates the Act). It could thus be argued that the importance of Act 
919 lies more in its historical significance - coming as it does at a particularly defining 
moment in the history of Ghanaian oil production – than in any substantive contribution 
which it has brought to the legal framework for upstream petroleum sector governance. 
The most pertinent challenge facing Ghana and its nascent oil industry is clearly that 
of defying the odds, and reversing the regional trend, by confounding the resource curse 
syndrome which has become such an endemic feature of natural resources endowment in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. For therein lies the true test of success as an emerging oil economy. Will 
Ghana finally emerge from underneath the ominous shadow of this historical syndrome? 
Overcoming this challenge will require effective implementation of the key principles of 
sustainability, good governance and utilization of oil revenues for the benefit of all 
Ghanaians, which are all embedded in the current legal framework. A robust, effective and 
efficient legal, regulatory and institutional framework is undoubtedly a fundamental 
requirement in this regard. Act 919 thus now needs to be transformed from a static into a 
living document – to wit, one that is responsive to every new challenge and to the changing 
national and global environment of the international petroleum industry. Industry practice 
will need to reflect the aspirations, ethos and legislative ambitions of Act 919. Relevant 
provisions may also require adjusting through a process of regular review and legislative 
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amendments to reflect realties on the ground - for example, possible excision from Act 919 of 
the contractual licence-free option in the future, if bidding rounds become regularly 
successful.  
 
